The Profitability of Block Trades in Auction and Dealer Markets by Andy Snell & Ian Tonks
The Pro…tability of Block Trades in Auction
and Dealer Markets




The paper compares the trading costs for institutional investors who are sub-
ject to liquidity shocks, of trading in auction and dealer markets. The batch
auction restricts the institutions’ ability to exploit informational advantages
because of competition between institutions when they simultaneously sub-
mit their orders. This competition lowers aggregate trading costs. In the
dealership market, competition between traders is absent but trades occur
in sequence so that private information is revealed by observing the ‡ow of
successive orders. This information revelation reduces trading costs in aggre-
gate. We analyse the relative e¤ects on pro…ts of competition in one system
and information revelation in the other and identify the circumstances under
which dealership markets have lower trading costs than auction markets and
vice versa.
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Market microstructure is concerned with the organisation of trading systems
in stock markets. In this paper we examine the importance of two di¤er-
ent types of market microstructures: an auction and a dealer market, for
the pro…ts of institutional investors who are trading large blocks of securi-
ties. A number of papers [Madhavan (1992), Biais (1992), Pagano and Roell
(1992, 1996), Shin (1996) and Vogler (1997)] have compared the properties
of auction and dealer markets, and a further string of papers [Holmstrom
and Tirole (1993), Admati, P‡eiderer and Zechner (1994), Bolton and von
Thadden (1998), Pagano and Roell (1998), Maug (1998)] have examined the
role of large shareholders in monitoring management, given that there will
be costs to this process. The contribution of this paper is to make the com-
parison between auction and dealer markets from the point of view of the
pro…ts of large institutional traders who are subject to liquidity shocks and
who trade blocks of securities at a time.
In comparing an order-driven auction market with a quote-driven dealer
market, Madhavan (1992) argues that the di¤erences in the two systems lie
in the sequence of trading, which leads to di¤erences in the information pro-
vided to the players and therefore in the strategic nature of the game. In the
quote-driven system competition between market makers in setting quotes
ensures that price quotes are competitive, and market makers make zero prof-
its, whereas in the order-driven system competition between dealers takes the
form of competition in demand schedules. Vogler (1997) extends this model
to the case of a dealer market in which dealers can trade with each other
in a separate inter-dealer market. Shin (1996) points out that a distinctive
feature of these two systems is the move order and consequent information
available to the traders when they take there respective actions. The auction
market requires that all traders take their actions simultaneously, whereas
in the dealership market the price setters move …rst and the buyers(sellers)
take their actions after observing the price quotes of the sellers(buyers). Bi-
ais (1993) compares price formation in fragmented and centralised markets.
The di¤erence between these two regimes is that a fragmented market is by
de…nition less transparent than a centralised one. Pagano and Roell (1992,
1996) compare the price formation process in four alternative market trad-
ing systems, where the transparency of the current order ‡ow de…nes the
di¤erences in the trading systems.
The growth in equity ownership by institutions investors has been docu-
1mented for US corporations by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and for UKcompa-
nies by Nyman and Silbertson (1978) and Leech and Leahy (1991). According
to Economic Trends 1993, over seventy percent of UK equity is held by insti-
tutional investors, and more than eighty …ve per cent of equity holdings are
held in blocks greater than one hundred thousand pounds in value. Interest
in corporate governance has prompted a number of papers to examine the
trade-o¤s for institutional investors who are able to monitor company perfor-
mance on account of their large stakes. Bhide (1993) in a provocative paper,
suggests that the deep liquidity of equity secondary equity markets in the US
are to the detriment of the monitoring responsibilities of shareholders. He
argues that because the secondary markets are so liquid, shareholders have
no incentive to monitor and are able “bail out” when there are any problems
in the …rm. Admati, P‡eiderer and Zechner (1994) examine the trade-o¤ be-
tween the monitoring advantages of a large shareholder and the risk sharing
disadvantages of large blocks for portfolio allocation decisions. Holmstrom
and Tirole (1993), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Pagano and Roell (1998),
Maug (1998) have focused on the advantages of a large shareholder in terms
of the incentives that they have to monitor management, but the disadvan-
tages of large blocks because of reduced liquidity, though Burkart et al argue
that too much monitoring could impose too many constraints on managers
to manage e¤ectively. .
The central problem addressed in the current paper is that large in-
stitutional shareholders face liquidity shocks, but they also possess private
knowledge about the …rm’s value as a direct consequence of the size of their
holdings. So that when liquidity shocks force the institutions to trade with
dealers, they face unfavourable prices and high trading costs. The …nancial
institution would like to trade in the trading system that minimises the cost
of trading, and we compare the trading costs for large institutions in batch
auction and dealership markets, in terms of expected pro…ts.
The batch auction restricts the institutions’ ability to exploit informa-
tional advantages because of competition between institutions when they
simultaneously submit their orders. This competition lowers aggregate trad-
ing costs. In the dealership market, competition between traders is absent
but trades occur in sequence so that private information is revealed by ob-
serving the ‡ow of successive orders. This information revelation reduces
trading costs in aggregate. We analyse the relative e¤ects on pro…ts of com-
petition in one system and information revelation in the other and identify
the circumstances under which dealership markets have lower trading costs
2than auction markets and vice versa.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline a model of
…nancial institutions (traders) and dealers. Sections 3 and 4 evaluates the
institutions’ aggregate pro…ts and section 5 examines the circumstances (pa-
rameter values) under which one system dominates another in this regard.
Section 6 examines the e¤ects of changing the correlation structure of liquid-
ity shocks and of allowing institutions to collude in the auction market and
section 7 provides a summary and conclusion.
2 The Model
Our model follows the approach taken in Madhavan (1992), who compares a
quote driven mechanism with competing dealers, with an order driven mech-
anism organised as a batch auction. In the dealer market traders trade se-
quentially and therefore trade independently of subsequent trades. Whereas
in the auction market all trades occur at the same time, so that traders act
strategically when submitting their demands. In Madhavan (1992) traders
may be acting on private information or because of a realisation of asset
endowments which generates portfolio hedging trades which are not infor-
mation motivated. In our model there are n traders in the market trading
in a security, and they also trade for two reasons. Trader i observes the true
value of the security v and is able to trade on the basis of this information
in the secondary market. Each trader also faces a liquidity shock ui, which
is the second motive for trading. These traders are taken to be large risk-
neutral institutional investors who discover the true value of the security v
which is distributed v » N(¹ v;¾2
v) after monitoring the company on account
of their large stake. In Madhavan (1992) traders in the market maximise an
exponential utility function, whereas in this paper traders utilise a di¤erent
objective function which emphasises the liquidity shocks that are faced by
…nancial institutions The institutional investors trade xi in the secondary
market, following Seppi (1992) to maximise the objective function in (1)




2 i = 1;2:::n (1)
The objective function (1) shows that traders generate income for each
unit of stock that they hold, by trading at price p when the true value of
the security is v. However these traders face a liquidity shock ui resulting in
3losses which are quadratic in the di¤erence between theirholdings of the asset
xi and the liquidity shock. The relative importance of the trading pro…ts and
the liquidity shock in the investors’ objective function is controlled by the
parameter ': Clearly the higher is ' the greater is the weight placed on the
liquidity shock. The advantage of the speci…c objective function is that we
are able to obtain expressions for the expected pro…ts to an institution from
trading under the two alternative microstructure systems
The institutional investors may be thought of as insurance companies
who are generating premium income outside the model. A negative liquidity
shock is interpreted as an unexpected insurance cash claim which must be
met by the company by either selling the security or by borrowing. Under
this interpretation the quadratic term(xi- ui)2 represents increasing marginal
borrowing costs. A positive liquidity shock may be interpreted as unexpected
premium income and in this case costs are incurred by failing to invest this
income in equities whose return exceeds that on liquid assets. In fact these
costs are more likely to be linearin (xi- ui). However, allowing forasymmetric
costs would make our model analytically intractable.. The quadratic term in
(1) therefore, must be viewed as approximating actual costs.
Market makers who are the only other market participants, and set prices
p are not able to infer exactly the value of the security from the trading
behaviour of the institutions since these institutions also trade because of
liquidity shocks, which are distributed ui » N(0;¾2
u): Note that if market
makers also observed the value v, then they would set prices equal to the true
value of the security, and traders could then set their demands equal to their
liquidity shock to ensure no worse than zero pro…ts. However because market
makers do not observe v directly, but infer it from the trading volumes, they
set prices to reduce the adverse selection problem from informed institutions
trading against them, and we shall see that this reduces the pro…ts of the
institutions.
This model is an extension of the insider trading model developed by Kyle
(1985), in which market makers set prices allowing for the likelihood that the
aggregate demand will re‡ect informed trading by insiders. An institutional
di¤erence though is that the original Kyle model is a batch auction in which
a single informed trader places his order in with a batch of liquidity orders.
The model considered here allows for a di¤erent market microstructure in
which traders deal directly with the market maker, but the market maker is
unable to identify which components of trades are liquidity motivated and
which are information motivated.
42.1 Oligopoly batch auction
A number of stock markets, such as the NYSE and the Paris Bourse open
their daily markets with a batch auction. In the oligopoly batch auction
considered here, each institutional investor submits his order to the market
maker at the same time, and the market maker announces a price that will
clear the market. Aggregate trading volume is X =
Pn
i=1xi. In this oligopoly
batch auction we recognise that each institutional trader knows that both
their own trades and their rival’s will have an impact on prices.
In order to …nd the equilibrium solution to this model we make the conjec-
ture that the aggregate trading volume is a linear function of the information
and the liquidity shocks, and a competitive market makers set prices as a lin-
ear function of the aggregate trading volume





p = ¹ v + ¸X (3)
To …nd the optimal trading volume of each strategic institutional trader i
substitute the conjectured price function (3) into the objective function (1).
The reaction function for the ith investor under the Cournot assumption that
each investor’s demands do not a¤ect the demands of the rival, is given by
xi =









All institutions face the same problem and since aggregate trading volume
is simply the sum of the n institutions’ trades, summing over i=1 to n in (4)
and rearranging gives the aggregate trading volume as
X =
n(v ¡ ¹ v)
(n + 1)¸ + '
+
'




which is indeed a linear function of the information and the liquidity
shocks. Comparing coe¢cients in (5) and (2) yields
¯ =
n
(n + 1)¸ + '
; °i =
'
(n + 1)¸ + '
[= °] (6)
Turning to the problem faced by the market maker, we assume that the
market maker acts competitively and sets prices as the expectation of the
5terminal value of the asset v conditional on the aggregate trading volume X
so that prices are




To compute this expectation we need to make assumptions about the corre-
lations between the liquidity shocks. In what follows we assume the liquidity
shocks are independent. This could arise for example if the insurance market
was divided into several niches each niche being identi…ed with an indepen-
dent source of risk and with a …rm insuring against that risk. An assump-
tion at the other extreme would be that the liquidity shocks are perfectly
correlated i.e. identical for all institutions. This would arise if all insurance
companies fully diversi…ed their risks in a secondary market so that they were
only exposed to economy-wide systematic risk. Because our institutions are
assumed to be risk neutral and therefore have no incentive to diversify risks
the uncorrelated shocks assumption seems more appropriate and we take this
as our main case. However, we examine the e¤ect that the assumption of
identical shocks has on our results later.
Joint normality of the models’ variates guarantees that E[vjX] and hence
p is linear in X which con…rms the conjecture for prices in equation (3).
Taking the liquidity shocks to be iid and using the standard formula for the
conditional expectation of normal variates gives ¸ in (3) as








We now have three equations in (6) and (8) and three unknowns ¯,¸ and






















Note that the second order condition for maximisation of the traders’
pro…ts is that '2¾2
u > ¾2
v. This condition indicates that a minimum amount
of noise trade variability is required to ensure that equilibrium exists and
that ¯ and ° are strictly positive.
Throughout this paper we assume that collusion between market traders
is illegal and/or infeasible. However it is interesting to compare the solution
6to the model in (9) and the in‡uence of the non-cooperative game played
between the n institutional investors with the problem of the “multi-plant”
monopoly investor which we discuss in the Appendix. In the non-cooperative
equilibrium in (9) the n institutional investors are trading too intensively
relative to the collusive outcome in A9. We discuss the e¤ects of collusion in
more detail later.
We now wish to compute the expected pro…ts to each trader before they
have observed either the value of the asset or their liquidity shock. We
need to substitute their optimal trades back in to the objective (1) and then
integrate over the joint distribution of v and ui.
The optimal demands for each trader are obtained by substituting (2)

























Substituting (3) and (10) into the pro…t function (1), taking expected
values over the value of the asset and the liquidity shocks and multiplying
by n (expected pro…ts are identical for each trader) gives expected pro…ts for



















where by abuse of notation we have used ¾4
u and ¾4




Equation (11) shows that expected pro…ts are always negative. To see
why thisis so note that expected pro…ts in equation (1) have two components.
The …rst E(v ¡ p)xi which we call trading pro…ts represents pure expected
gains or losses to the institution from trading. The second ('=2)E(xi ¡ui)2
which we call liquidity cost (cost because it enters institutional pro…ts with
a minus sign) is always positive.
Lemma 1 Institutional trading pro…ts are always zero




E[(v ¡ p)xi] = E[(v ¡ p)X] =
Z 1
¡1








fE[vjX] ¡ E[vjX]gX f(X)dX = 0 (13)
Aggregate institutional trading pro…ts are always zero and it is easy to
see that this implies that each institution’s trading pro…t is also zero. k
Because liquidity costs are always positive, pro…ts of each institution are
always negative. The intuition as to why trading pro…ts are zero is because
faced with the adverse selection problem of trading with informed institu-
tions, the market maker sets ”fair” prices given knowledge of the current
order ‡ow i.e. he sets prices such that expected trading pro…ts conditional
on trading volume are zero. Therefore the institutions can never o¤set liq-
uidity costs with trading pro…ts. Note that if there was no adverse selection
problem [¾2
v ! 0], then expected pro…ts to the institutional traders in equa-
tion (11) rise to zero. In this case the market maker knows that he does not
face an informed trader, and the institutions can then trade to just o¤set
their liquidity shocks (i.e. they can trade an amount xi = ui at a ”fair”
price). In the more general case [¾2
v > 0], the institutions are forced to trade
at a loss because they are unable to credibly commit to the market maker
that they are not trading on information. Of course if they make negative ex-
pected pro…ts in the long run the institutions would cease to exist. However
in reality equities pay dividends (our security does not) and insurance com-
panies charge premiums higher than the expected insurance claims. Neither
of these two sources of income are modelled here because we wished to focus
on trading costs and liquidity factors alone, but they would both presumably
ensure that the pro…ts of insurance companies were positive in the long run.
Note also the market maker in the ”multi-plant” monopoly case knows
that the colluding institutions are acting strategically and sets a higher mark-
up which actually reduces the monopoly pro…ts. From the Result 3 in the
Appendix, it can be seen that expected pro…ts in the collusive case are ac-
tually lower than the sum of the joint pro…ts in the non-collusive case. The
anomalous e¤ect of competition in increasing institutional pro…ts is an im-
portant feature of oligopoly batch auctions. It is important to bear this e¤ect
in mind when we compare this case with that of the sequential dealership
8which where serial monopoly exists and such competitive e¤ects on pro…ts
are absent.
2.2 Sequential dealer market
In the sequential dealer market each investor trades separately with the mar-
ket maker, and therefore the market maker may o¤er di¤erent prices to the
two investors. The investors approach the market maker sequentially, and
the market maker completes a trade with the …rst investor before dealing
with the second. Dealer markets are to be found in less-liquid stocks on the
London Stock Exchange, on the foreign exchange markets and NASDAQ. As
before, the …rst investor maximises (1), but this time we conjecture that the
trading volume of the individual investor is a linear function of the informa-
tion, and the market maker sets price as a linear function of the individual
investor’s trading volume
x1 = ¯1(v ¡ v) + °1u1 (14)
and
p1 = v + ¸1x1 (15)
The …rst investor now acts as a monopolist and therefore does not have
to worry about the e¤ect of his rival’s trading volume on prices. The optimal








Market makers act competitively and set prices to the …rst investor as
the expectation of the terminal value of the asset v conditional on the …rst
investor’s trading volume x1. Under this assumption ¸1 is analogous to the
¸ of the previous section and is given as ¸1 = cov(x1;v)=var(x1)






















We again want to obtain an expression for expected pro…ts for the trader.
Using (16) and the coe¢cients in (17), we may write the optimal trades of








[v ¡ ¹ v + 'u1] (18)
The equilibrium price faced by the …rst investor is obtained by substitut-
ing (18) into the conjectured pricing rule (15)






[v ¡ ¹ v + 'u1] (19)
Substituting (18) and (19) into 1) and taking expected values, we obtain








Now consider the second investor’s trading strategy. This investor also
trades as a monopolist and does not have to worry about the strategic im-
plications of his rival’s trading: His objective function is given by (1) which
does not directly depend on previous trades. Once more we assume that the
market maker sets ”fair” prices ie. sets prices equal to the expectation of v
conditioned on knowledge of x1 and x2. This would imply the market maker
setting p2 as the linear (least squares) projection of v on x1 and x2: However
to expose the recursive structure of the problem and to simplify the solution,
we taking an indirect route to the setting of prices by the market maker.
First, we conjecture that in equilibrium, optimal trades in the second
period are uncorrelated with those of the …rst. Then, following the …rst
trade, the market maker computes an updated distribution for v given by
v » N(¹ v1;¾2
vj1) where


















He then sets prices to the second trader in an analogous way to the …rst
trader, p2 = ¹ v1 +¸2x2;where, ¸2 is analogous to ¸1in (15) above and is given
by ¸2 = cov[x2;(v¡v1)]=var[x2jx1]. Using conjecture for prices in the pro…ts
function gives optimal demands for the second monopolist as
10x2 = ¯2(v ¡ ¹ v1) + °2u2 (23)
which clearly shows that optimal demands in the second period x2, are indeed
independent of those in the …rst x1, (and are also normally distributed). The
independence of equilibrium trades now implies that, prices in the second
period satisfy
p2 = ¹ v1 + ¸2x2 = E(vjx1) + ¸2x2 = p1 + E(vjx2) = E[vjx1;x2] (24)
where the last equality con…rms that the conjectured prices are indeed fair.
Solutions for ¯2;¸2 and°2 may be computed as in (17).
It is easily seen that the recursive solution to the problem given above
for the …rst two trades may be generalised to trade j. Solutions for ¯j ,
¸j, and E¼dealer
j , ¹ vj and ¾2
v jjf= var(vjx1;x2::::xj)g may be obtained from
equations (16) - (20) respectively by replacing the right hand side terms
¾2
vjj¡1and ¹ vj¡1with ¾2
v and ¹ v respectively. Adapting equation (17) in this















The solution shows clearly that ¸j is increasing in ¾2
vjj¡1 and that ¯j is
decreasing in ¾2


















respectively. Given the initial condition ¾2
v j0 = ¾2
v, Equations (26) and
(27) may be solved recursively to give an explicit form for the jth trader’s
pro…ts for j=2,3...n. To get a closed form for expected pro…ts for the jth
































u + (j ¡1)¾2
v)
(29)
Proposition 1 ¯j Â ¯j¡1 and ¸j Á ¸j¡1
Proof.
From (25) ¯j is decreasing in ¾2
vjj¡1 and ¸j is increasing in ¾2
vjj¡1. Further,
(28) shows that ¾2
vjj¡1 is decreasing with j k
² The proposition shows that the jth trader trades more aggressively
than the j ¡ 1th, as a consequence of the updated variance of v hav-
ing fallen. Further as the covariance of the underlying value of the
asset and the order ‡ow will have fallen, the market maker set a lower
mark-up to the jth trader. The information revelation that occurs as
successive institutions trade increases the pro…ts of successive traders
as is clear from (29). This is an important e¤ect in a sequential dealer-
ship market that is absent from a ”one-o¤” batch auction where each
trader’s expected pro…ts are the same. As noted in the previous section
however, the fact that each institution acts as a monopolist works to
reduce the institutions’ pro…ts. We examine the net impact of the two
e¤ects of competition and sequential information revelation in the next
section.
3 Comparison of the two alternative market
mechanisms
To compare the expected pro…ts under the auction and dealer markets given
in (11) and (29) we …rst take the case of two …rms (i.e. the cases of duopoly
and two sequential monopolists respectively) and then generalise to n …rms.
The following theorem which is the main result of the paper, states that
whether one market mechanism is preferred to the other depends on the
relative values of the uncertainty about the fundamental, and the importance
of the liquidity shocks.






In comparing the expected pro…ts to the institutional investors from trading
in an auction or dealer market
(i) For n = 2 a necessary and su¢cient condition for auction markets to
yield highest expected pro…ts is
0 < c < 0:36
(ii) For n = 2 a necessary and su¢cient condition for dealer markets to
yield highest expected pro…ts is
0:36 < c < 1
(iii) For n > 2 condition (ii) applies with su¢ciency only
(iv) A su¢cient condition for auction markets to yield highest expected
pro…ts is






For n = 2 comparing (11) with (29)shows that pro…ts will be greater in







































Rearranging and solving this inequality for c, dealer markets are preferred
as c > 0:36. This establishes the one side of (i). Recall from the parameter







u = c < 1, which establishes the other side of (i).k
In the range 0:36 < c < 1 the dealer market will be preferred by these
institutional traders. Therefore in the range 0 < c < 0:36 the auction market
will yield the highest expected pro…ts to the traders. This establishes (ii)jj
13